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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
‘Tiny Iceland’ preparing for Ebola in a globalized world
Geir Gunnlaugsson a, Íris Eva Hauksdóttir b, Ib Christian Bygbjerg b and Britt Pinkowski Tersbøl b
aFaculty of Sociology, Anthropology and Folkloristics, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland; bSchool of Global Health, Department of
Public Health, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
ABSTRACT
Background: The Ebola epidemic in West Africa caused global fear and stirred up worldwide
preparedness activities in countries sharing borders with those affected, and in geographically
far-away countries such as Iceland.
Objective: To describe and analyse Ebola preparedness activities within the Icelandic health-
care system, and to explore the perspectives and experiences of managers and frontline
health workers.
Methods: A qualitative case study, based on semi-structured interviews with 21 staff mem-
bers in the national Ebola Treatment Team, Emergency Room at Landspitali University
Hospital, and managers of the response team.
Results: Contextual factors such as culture and demography influenced preparedness, and
contributed to the positive state of mind of participants, and ingenuity in using available
resources for preparedness. While participants believed they were ready to take on the task of
Ebola, they also had doubts about the chances of Ebola ever reaching Iceland. Yet, factors
such as fear of Ebola and the perceived stigma associated with caring for a potentially
infected Ebola patient, influenced the preparation process and resulted in plans for specific
precautions by staff to secure the safety of their families. There were also concerns about the
teamwork and lack of commitment by some during training. Being a ‘tiny’ nation was seen as
both an asset and a weakness in the preparation process. Honest information sharing and
scenario-based training contributed to increased confidence amongst participants in the
response plans.
Conclusions: Communication and training were important for preparedness of health staff in
Iceland, in order to receive, admit, and treat a patient suspected of having Ebola, while
doubts prevailed on staff capacity to properly do so. For optimal preparedness, likely
scenarios for future global security health threats need to be repeatedly enacted, and areas
plagued by poverty and fragile healthcare systems require global support.
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Background
On 8 August 2014, the World Health Organization
declared the Ebola epidemic in West Africa as
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
(PHEIC) under the International Health Regulations
(IHR) [1]. All three of the worst affected countries
were to address the emerging epidemic challenge
without staff, stuff, space and systems [2–4]. With
the epidemic seemingly out of control, and
a proportionately high number of doctors, nurses,
and midwives succumbing to Ebola [5], there was
a growing fear of transmission beyond the region. In
breach of WHO recommendations and guidelines [6],
flights were cancelled and cross-border movement
curtailed [7]. The epidemic caused public concern
outside West Africa [8], as fear and racism found
fertile ground [9–11], and in an effort to stop the
international spread of the disease, all states were
advised to be prepared to detect, investigate, and man-
age Ebola cases [1].
Preparedness as part of disaster risk reduction is
defined as ‘the knowledge and capacities developed by
governments, response and recovery organizations, com-
munities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond
to, and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or
current disasters’ [12]. Yet, preparedness is also envel-
oped in and influenced by the socio-cultural dimension at
the individual, organizational, and national levels, and
measures to manage outbreaks are not always accepted
or accommodated by the communities to which they are
applied [13]. An analysis of eight European countries’
preparedness plans since 2009 for countering a future
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic revealed that the way
plans were framed varied considerably, and ‘[told] us
something about how the different countries want pan-
demics and preparedness to be understood by the public’
[14]. More research was encouraged into cultural and
social structures in the respective countries.
In Iceland, information about the Ebola epidemic in
West Africa came from several sources. The Directorate
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of Health (DH) first reported on the epidemic on
8 April 2014 [15]. In Icelandic media, the rapid progress
of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa was increasingly
highlighted, and exported Ebola cases to Spain, USA, and
elsewhere, were widely covered. Fear of a global epidemic
was rife, and in media and online discussions, doubts
were raised about the Icelandic health system´s capacity
to take care of a patient with Ebola [16–18], despite its
ranking as one of the best in the world [16].
On 11 August 2014, three days after WHO declared
PHEIC because of Ebola, DH encouraged Icelandic citi-
zens to avoid visits to the area, if possible, and reported
that the national epidemic preparedness plan was being
activated for Ebola [19]. It was elaborated by a team that
involved the Chief Epidemiologist at the DH, Landspitali
University Hospital (LSH), the Department of Civil
Protection and Emergency Management (DCPEM),
and the seven Primary Healthcare Regional
Organizations in the country at the time. Key external
partners were the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC) and WHO, in addition
to Nordic collaborators in epidemic preparedness [20].
At the same time, it was regarded as highly unlikely that
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) would spread in the country
[21]. Recognized scenarios included the possible appear-
ance of an infected person in need of treatment, who
could be either an Icelandic citizen who had visited or
worked in one of the affected West African countries, or
a person with signs of EVD on a trans-Atlantic flight in
the navigation area controlled by Icelandic authorities
[22–25]. On 3 November 2014, the plan was put to the
test when a foreign airlinemade a non-scheduled landing
at Keflavík International Airport due to fear of EVD in
one passenger from South Africa. Parked in a closed-off
area, a physician in full Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) entered the plane, but quickly ruled out Ebola [26].
Irrespective of good or bad overall performance,
health systems are tested in times of crisis, such as epi-
demics. Here, the aim is to describe and analyse the
process of establishing preparedness plans for Ebola in
Iceland, with a specific focus on the perspectives and
experiences of managers and frontline health workers
involved in the process.
Methods
This study is part of a larger study on the impact that the
global threat of the Ebola epidemic had in Iceland [16,27].
Qualitative case studymethodology was applied, perceiv-
ing the preparedness planning and training process as the
case with clear boundaries of the initiation, process, and
wrap-up of preparedness planning and training. The
study was conducted in April-May 2016, and the inter-
viewed participants were administrators and frontline
health professionals central to the case, so as to explore
their perspectives and experiences concerning Ebola pre-
paredness [28,29]. Staff in managerial positions were
contacted by one of the authors (GG) for permission to
interview them based on their role in the preparedness
plan. To identify potential interviewees in the Ebola
Treatment Team (ETT), the director of the team listed
relevant email contacts. Those who responded positively
were subsequently invited for an interview, conducted in
Icelandic by one of the authors (ÍEH), a physiotherapist.
In case interviewees suggested other potential partici-
pants, they were invited through email to participate.
A similar methodology was applied to identify partici-
pants from the Emergency Room (ER). They were
included in order to represent frontline health workers
who worked in the only ER in Reykjavík, where persons
exposed to EVDwere most likely to first seek care in case
of acute illness.
Three separate interview guides were developed –
one each for managers, ETT, and ER respectively (see
supplementary material). The interviews included open
questions probing the role of their institution in pre-
paredness, the experience of the training process, chal-
lenges encountered or expected, and any dilemmas
that they may have experienced in relation to the
preparedness plan. The recruitment of participants
was concluded when saturation was reached. Each
interview was recorded and took about 20 to 60 min-
utes; they were then transcribed and analysed using
thematic analysis. The data material was read through
repeatedly, sorted, and categorized, based on the parti-
cipants’ priorities in the representation of their views.
From this exercise, three broad themes were induc-
tively identified that corresponded to critical perspec-
tives introduced by the participants.
Permission to conduct the study was granted by
Iceland’s National Bioethics Committee (VSN-
15–192) and Landspitali University Hospital (LSH
13–16, 4 February 2016). Reporting on the results
was guided by the COREC guidelines [30]; how-
ever, to ensure anonymity of the respondents
within the small community of staff who took
part in the preparedness activities, participant
information is not associated to quotations.
Results
Theme 1 – getting the job done
The Icelandic Ebola Preparedness Plan included the
establishment of an ETT within LSH [31], and the
preparatory activities engaged more than two hun-
dred staff across all of its departments. The ETT
consisted of about 50 healthcare professionals who
had volunteered to participate, including 11 doctors
and 28 nurses, a few laboratory technicians, radi-
ologists, and auxiliary nurses. They attended special
training sessions focused on protocols for admis-
sion and treatment of a patient with EVD, the
donning/doffing of PPE, and personal protective
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measures during patient care. A new provisory unit
was designed to be set up on the ground floor to
minimize the risk of infection spreading to other
units within the hospital, with two rooms specifi-
cally identified for the care of a patient with
EVD [31].
Managers’ accounts of this period elaborated the
complexity of preparedness planning in terms of the
involved institutions, actors, procedures and require-
ment of the plan. One manager concluded:
You get no discount. You can never go the shorter
way. There was always something that surprised you.
We thought this was a lot like a three headed mon-
ster, so when you chopped off one of its heads, three
other emerged, every solution was followed by more
problems.
The health professionals who volunteered to join
ETT did so for different reasons. Ebola preparedness
was ‘a job that had to be done’, and ‘someone had to do
it’. Some referred to ethical or professional obligations:
This is just a part of being a nurse, to encounter
situations that can be dangerous to you or someone
else, but you have made this decision and you deal
with it.
Some connected their decision to their ‘action
gene’ or ‘addiction to taking risks’, while others said
they had already raised their kids and had years of
experience, including work with other epidemics,
such as HIV. Yet, the practice of volunteering in the
preparation was questioned. One participant said:
We learned that we could not rely on volunteers …
when you work in an infectious disease department
you cannot choose what infections you want to work
with.
ER staff indicated that for them working in the ER
was enough of a risk to take, no reason to expose
oneself even more by joining the ETT, and appre-
ciated that others had volunteered.
All participants noted that co-operation and com-
munication had generally functioned well during the
preparedness planning, with information flowing
both ways. Short communication lines within the
healthcare system were perceived as both a strength
and a weakness; a strength, insofar as people knew
each other, but a weakness because of the uneven
burden of workload. Staff of the ETT and in the ER
felt they had been well-informed, and that openness
and honesty had characterized the planning and
diminished their initial fear. Those in managerial
positions had listened and taken their opinions into
consideration. One said:
They were honest, no one was hiding anything,
everything was on the table, no one tried to make
things more appealing and say that everything would
be OK, they just told us about things as they were.
Theme 2 – trust, doubt and fear
Both management and participants from the ETT and
ER expressed their ambiguity in terms of trust, doubt,
and fear. Participants conveyed trust in the health system
and their own role as health professionals, while at the
same time admitting to facing formidable challenges
during the elaboration of the preparedness plan.
Facilities for isolation and treatment of patients with
Ebola were less than perfect:
We assessed how we could use the department …
and change it in just a few hours into some kind of
an isolation unit that we could possibly use.
Some compared this short-term isolation facility to
a ‘camping site’, as the facilities were too provisional
and not comparable to those found elsewhere. There
was also doubt about how many Ebola patients LSH
would be able to care for: ‘Maybe one or two patients,
barely more’.
Respondents believed that the training and education
of the members of the ETT and ER had been satisfactory.
They felt that it had been proportionate to the risk, while
some were concerned about the lack of staff.
Nonetheless, there were contradictions on the division
of labour among the professionals, exemplified by differ-
ent ideas on how to proceed if a patient suspected of
having an EVD came in an ambulance to the LSH for
treatment. Almost all participants stated that they were
ready to do their part in the Ebola response, or ‘as ready
as [we] could be’.
There were diverse opinions on what it meant to be
ready: to treat one confirmed case of Ebola, one sus-
pected case, or more EVD patients? When asked if
Ebola was a real threat to the country, participants
usually referred to how easy it was to travel the globe:
‘Yeah, why not, the world is getting smaller’. Although
Ebola was thought of as a real danger by many, some
participants expressed difficulty in taking their training
seriously, doubting that Ebola would ever reach Iceland.
One respondent said:
People were dedicated in the beginning, but when
the news appeared that Ebola was receding, that
diminished, and I never felt like this formally ended.
Participants described their relief that nothing
really happened, while emphasizing the need to
experience a real situation to evaluate the prepared-
ness efforts. One participant said that ‘a little bit more
seriousness [would have been] needed in the PPE
practices’.
It was taken as a manifestation of fear that some of
the staff in the communicable disease department of the
LSH refused to take part in the ETT. When describing
their fears, ETT members frequently connected it to
their working conditions. Many of them were afraid
that they would not get the best PPE, others that they
would not do the donning/doffing correctly and, lastly,
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they were worried about work performance while in the
PPE. One participant said:
What bothered most of us was how uncomfortable
the PPE was and I think that made people nervous:
“How will I manage working in this for hours?”
Another described the donning/doffing process
like a ‘complicated ballroom dance’. Moreover, parti-
cipants were afraid of ‘unknown territories’, that is,
they did not know the hospital ward, they were sup-
posed to work in, and some team members had no
recent experience of clinical work. One participant
said:
I didn’t think these [non-clinical] people belonged in
the team, because this is a very clinical environment
in addition to having to be in this costume [PPE]
with the risk of becoming infected by mistake.
Those with non-clinical background were, how-
ever, aware of their limitations:
I realized that I would not be the one in the front,
I would not be managing patients directly.
The importance ascribed to teamwork was evident in
relation to fear. Participants described fear of working
with people they had not worked with before:
The weakest link in the preparation was that even
though I knew their faces, I had never worked with
them.
Another issue was no-show by some team mem-
bers in training sessions or in lectures:
This is team-work, one does this and the other one
does this, [we] help each other. Then you don’t want
to be working with someone who didn’t show up.
Another one said:
There were a lot of doctors who just dropped in,
dropped out, and then dropped in again. I asked
myself: Are these individuals … ready to take
this on?
Participants in the ETT mentioned the precautions
they took or intended to take to cope with their feelings
of fear, should Ebola emerge in Iceland. A major precau-
tion was planning to avoid contact with the family while
working with Ebola patients. One participant said: ‘You
thought … about your children at school … parents in
the neighbourhood …’ if they knew (s)he was working
with an Ebola patient. For them, it was important they
would have access to special accommodation in case of
clinical EVD work ‘so I wouldn’t be exposing anyone or
creating hysteria’. ETT members mentioned the extra
insurance offered as a prerequisite for taking part in the
team. ‘The normal insurance for LHS staff would not
cover everything if we were to become sick or even lose
our lives.’ Amongst ER staff, the matter of insurance did
seem to be less of an issue compared to the ETT. One
respondent said: ‘You are used to being at risk by many
disease threats’. Furthermore, the issue of higher salaries
and risk commission came up in the interviews, but
overall did not matter as much to the participants as the
insurance, or assurance of accommodation in case of
need.
Theme 3 – the Icelandic way
Characteristics associated with Iceland and the
Icelandic people were referred to repeatedly by parti-
cipants. The concept ‘Tiny Iceland’ was often men-
tioned and emerged with positive and negative
connotations. ‘Tiny Iceland’ referred to the size of
the country and population and its perceived capabil-
ity to still ‘get the job done’. even though compro-
mises had to be made. Comparing how Iceland
handled its responsibilities differently from other
countries of a larger size was often brought up, both
with pride in Iceland as a strong independent nation,
and with insecurities about its capacity in comparison
to other countries. It was pointed out that since the
preparedness process was in the hands of a few peo-
ple, everyone knew their role. As one administrator
said:
This little hospital system, as complicated as it might
seem every day, gives you the chance to just pick up
the phone and call the one in charge.
Being a small population presents challenges regard-
ing resources, infrastructure, and specialized medical
training to comply with standards of international
actors. Notions of Icelanders as resilient in spite of
shortcomings were common; referring to the experi-
ence of preparedness planning and training, one health
staff said:
It was very much the Icelandic way, we’ll manage,
we’ll work it out, and there was so much ingenuity.
This notion of a particular Icelandic approach to
coping, in spite of shortcomings, was also detected
more generally, as in the statement:
Would it have worked? Yes, it would have worked.
Would it have been optimal? We cannot say, it
would have been optimal; we can say, it would
have been sufficient.
In contrast to this, there were concerns about
whether Icelandic aid workers falling ill in Ebola-
affected countries should be transferred to Iceland
or to hospitals in other Nordic countries with better
isolation units. Some of the participants trusted that
patients with EVD would not be transferred to
Iceland. One participant stated:
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You heard that Norwegians were criticized for trans-
ferring their aid worker from Africa to Norway. We
don’t know what would have happened if they would
have transferred an Icelander into the country.
Another participant said:
We don’t have good enough isolation units – you are not
supposed to send patients to a hospital that is less than
100%. I thought there was assurance in that.
Discussion
During the devastating Ebola epidemic in West Africa
that spread to neighbouring sub-Saharan countries,
North America, and Europe [32], preparedness plans
were widely elaborated and later evaluated. Evaluations
have, for example, been conducted in 11 African coun-
tries close to the epidemic [33], in the EU region
[34,35], and the US [36]. Here we present data from
a qualitative case study on the process, and experiences
with establishing a preparedness plan for Ebola in
Iceland in 2014. Interviews with staff who were
engaged, either as administrators or frontline healthcare
workers, alert us to the manner in which geographic,
demographic, cultural, and organizational characteris-
tics shaped the response. The results show that the
process of establishing and training for preparedness
was permeated by ambiguities of pride and pragmatism,
trust, doubts, and fear.
‘Getting the job done’ (theme 1) refers to the multi-
tude of tasks and considerations that surrounds and
feeds into the preparedness plan itself and are necessary
for successful planning and implementation. Using the
metaphors of ‘hard core’ and ‘soft periphery’, Langley
and Denis [37] emphasize the importance of relatively
‘peripheral’ concerns and processes for planning and
implementation of new interventions. The hard core
represents the actual intervention or goal, e.g. imple-
mentation of a preparedness plan. The soft periphery
refers to all the contextually important networking,
negotiations, and agreements necessary to deliver the
hard core. If the soft periphery is neglected, it will cause
multiple challenges in the implementation process, and
the beneﬁt of the hard core, the intervention itself, may
not transpire as anticipated. Due attention to the soft
periphery may, however, considerably promote the
delivery of an innovation, and secure support from
important stakeholders. In our data, one manager
speaks of the preparedness process as dealing with
a three-headed monster where every solution was fol-
lowed by new problems. The data indicate that the
process of dealing with ‘the three headed monster’ was
given due attention as a means to successfully develop
Iceland’s preparedness plan. Comprehensive consulta-
tions and the involvement of many associated institu-
tions were mentioned. Still ambiguity remained with
some staff in terms of division of responsibilities and
tasks – e.g. when transporting a patient potentially
infected with Ebola from the airport to the hospital,
and other such activities.
During epidemics, rumours, gossip, and unreliable
information on the news and social media spread
rapidly, resulting in so-called ‘infodemics’ [38]. The
West African Ebola epidemic was covered widely by
media [39], and the fear of Ebola reached every corner
of the world, exemplified by travel bans from affected
countries, and trade barriers [40], in contrast to the
ongoing epidemic in the Democratic Republic of
Congo [41,42]. In our second theme, trust, doubt, and
fear of health workers were represented. Although all
intentions were good, concerns remained about the
suitability and safety of the isolation ward, the PPE,
and other tools, as well as adequate engagement of
colleagues who might potentially work alongside
them, in case an Ebola patient came to Iceland. The
foreignness of putting on, removing, and working from
within a PPE and the trustworthiness of available PPE
were mentioned. In preparedness efforts in other coun-
tries, scarcity of resources in relation to manpower
demand and problems with training and protocols
involving PPE were common challenges [35]. Similar
problems were encountered in Iceland. Provisory treat-
ment facility had to be designed, called ‘camping site’ by
some, in contrast to facilities found elsewhere [43].
Further, the ETT was established based on voluntary
recruitment rather than on the staff’s assigned roles
within the healthcare system, a procedure that was
deemed less than optimal. The members of the ETT
pointed out that they had never worked together as
a team under circumstances that demanded strict
adherence to infectious control procedures. This eroded
trust, compounded by the laissez-faire attitude of some
of its members during the preparation exercises, possi-
bly due to other competing tasks in a busy hospital and
insufficient resources that hampered full participation
[44]. Further, it was a constraint that simulation exer-
cises were not an option, found to be an important
element in preparation for epidemics [35]. This might
have resulted in less than optimal staff protection for
those who would have been in direct contact with an
infected patient, as reported during the SARS epidemic
in Canada [45,46].
Anthropological work on emergency preparedness
emphasizes the connectedness between health profes-
sionals, technological devices, and knowledge as a pre-
requisite for successful preparedness. Wolf and Hall
present preparedness efforts as a form of governance
that involves human bodies (those of health profes-
sionals), clinical architectures (e.g. isolation wards),
and technical artefacts (gloves, protective suits, disin-
fectants, etc.) [47]. During preparedness training and
implementation, ‘nursing bodies are transformed into
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instruments of preparedness’, and become part of infra-
structural arrangements. Health professionals are, here,
both vulnerable and powerful tools in the management
of contamination. The authors argue that successful
planning, training, and implementation of
a preparedness plan require such intrinsic connected-
ness. In the case of Ebola preparedness in Iceland,
health professionals draw our attention to dilemmas
of connectedness, and their assessment of the fact that
these shortcomings might hamper the mobilization of
‘preparedness within the human body’ – that is, the
embodied experience, routine, and tacit knowledge
which Wolf and Hall state are key to successful imple-
mentation. Repeated enactment of receiving and treat-
ing a patient with Ebola within experienced and trustful
teams would probably enhance such embodiment, pro-
vided that there is justified trust in the involved tech-
nology. In addition, repetition would also strengthen
the ‘soft periphery’ of preparedness, and divisions of
responsibilities would be clearer manifested.
In the third theme, we observe how notions of the
‘Icelandic way’ help participants make sense of ambigu-
ities about Ebola preparedness. Loftsdóttir explored how
people negotiated the imagination of the local and the
global during the 2008 economic crisis in Iceland [48].
Notions of the intrinsic character of Iceland, and of being
Icelandic, serve to underscore certain points and explain
positive and negative experiences with the preparedness
plan. Iceland is far away from the continents, but still
connected through global needs for policy, risk of con-
tamination, and dependency in terms of collaboration, in
emergencies emerging from elsewhere. In our study,
participants highlighted the importance of believing in
oneself and the ‘Icelandic way of doing things,’ summed
up in the paraphrase ‘þetta reddast’ (things always have
a way of working out in the end). The preparedness plan
had to be completed, and adapted to Iceland’s particular
global situation.
In the 21st century, the world has faced new epidemic
threats, such as SARS, and old scourges such as the plague
have resurfaced [38]. One of the main findings on Ebola
preparedness measures in the EU was that measures
taken were based on past preparedness and experience
of other epidemics, such as SARS and H1N1 [35].
Further, key stakeholders within each country found
their measures to have been adequate for dealing with
a single case of Ebola, as was the case in Iceland.
A preparedness plan for pandemic influenzae in Iceland
was elaborated in 2006 – activated in response to the
H1N1 epidemic in 2009 – and revised in 2016 [49].
During the elaboration of these plans, communication
among the different levels of the healthcare system and
supporting agencies, such as the DCPEM, had been
clearly defined, and proved to be useful in the prepared-
ness for Ebola. Further, as found important in prepared-
ness activities for pandemic influenzae elsewhere [44],
honesty, transparency in communication, and sharing
of information from managers to front-line health pro-
fessionals, was found to be critical. It gave a feeling of
being involved, andmitigated the fear that is so frequently
encountered during epidemics [38].
Conclusions
Iceland was far away from the epicentre of the Ebola
epidemic in West Africa. Yet this case study shows that
health professionals felt the strain of possibly having to
treat one or more patients with EVD. Their situation
stands in sharp contrast to the situation in the three
worst affected West African countries that lacked staff,
stuff, space, and systems to effectively address the chal-
lenge of EVD. Although Icelandic health professionals
had trust in the national healthcare system, and in their
own capacity, doubt and fear influenced the reflections
on preparedness planning of both administrators and
healthcare staff. References to national identity and the
characteristic of an ‘Icelandic approach’ to handling chal-
lenges assisted participants in coming to terms with the
experienced shortcomings of the preparedness plan, and
underscored the pride in the ingenuity applied in the
process. These references negotiate the role and character
of the nation of Iceland, and its role in a globalized world,
as both a small and isolated nation on one hand, and
a central and capable one, on the other.
The experienced ambiguity needs attention in a health
system and among healthcare staff that have to act reso-
lutely and unfailingly, should they be placed in charge of
containing contamination. This study points to the
necessity of repeatedly re-enacting, as realistically as pos-
sible, the likely scenarios of receiving and treating one or
more patients infected with Ebola (or other contagious
global health threats) as a routine matter. This would
assist in the identification of overlooked ‘soft periphery’
concerns, and promote embodied preparedness among
teams of health care staff on the frontline.
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